As recently as one year ago, the European Union was seemingly on a direct path toward its avowed goal of "ever closer union." In numerous publications, EU authorities asserted that they had the confidence of European peoples desirous only of further integration. In
Introduction
'Non.' 'Nee.' Two little words, one great furor. In late spring 2005, the initiative for a European Constitution was derailed after a majority of French and Dutch voters voted 'no' in referenda that had been envisioned by the European Communities as "an important step in the construction of Europe."
1 Until this setback, the construction of a new Europe, strong, united and rapidly evolving towards its own vision of a progressive society had seemed to be on course. In numerous publications, the EU authorities asserted that they had the support of a European peoples desirous of a united Europe.
2 Yet how was the task of convincing Europe's citizenry being accomplished? Institutions of the European Union, buoyed by a profound confidence in their goal of "ever closer union," persistently produced a literature (propaganda to some, information to others) that explained the campaigns and competences of the European Union and revealed the trajectory of European integration. This literature, however, exhibited a frightfully high incidence of revisionism, being substantively revised from edition to edition to present an ever more "correct" vision of recent European history.
The cost of such a course was altogether too high --the recent failed initiative for a European Constitution has soundly shaken the self-assurance of European integrationists and led to questioning the means by which the support of the European populace had been obtained. In light of this recent setback, the time has come to revisit -1950-2000 (2000) are substantially different in terms of how the events of the post-war period in European history have been interpreted by the author. Despite the difference in the works' titles and the different conclusions drawn in the two texts, however, it is clear from the most cursory of glances at the structure and contents of the publications that the latter work is a revision of the earlier text. In sum, the similarities establish the fact that these are merely different editions of the same text while the differences, the examination of which we shall now turn to, in aggregate serve to reconstitute history. European problems but has become an attempt to create a new Europe. Second, "invite", a word suggestive of directorship of a project or activity, is replaced by "associate", a word used to convey the impression that both parties are part of a larger grouping or project and that neither has control of the enterprise. Europe thus becomes an actor independent of its constituent states.
The discussion of the directorship of the European project dovetails closely with the subject of the democratic deficit and how the EU is often seen as an entity that has assumed control over a wide-ranging set of competences despite having far too few channels through which European citizens can exercise democratic control. With this concern in mind, it comes as a surprise to find Pascal Fontaine revealing in his 1990 text "that the Schuman Plan was the result of a conspiracy" (1990, p.12) . Ten years on, numerous institutional changes later and doubtless mindful of the difficulties encountered in ratifying the Treaty of Maastricht, this controversial and ill-chosen statement is removed. The historical record is thereby purged of a reference to an act of intrigue that only undermines the EU's credibility in an era during which criticisms of the European Union's democratic deficit have been bandied about far too regularly to be ignored.
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Pascal Fontaine has also used his texts as a forum for laying out how the European Union's raison d'etre has changed. In 1990, for instance, the European Union was envisioned by the author as an area in which "the merging of economic interests would help to raise the standard of living and pave the way for the establishment of an economic community" (1990, p.13) while ten years on this phrase is changed to read "the fusion of these economic interests will help to raise the standard of living and establish a
European Community" (2000, p.15) . Via this alteration, the author clearly shows that the economic role of the European Union has been subsumed within the larger goal of creating a community whose form transcends the purely economic sphere. That possibility, however, should not 7 The democratic deficit is a problem that has over the years increasingly plagued the EU in its quest for legitimacy. Stefan Elbe, for instance, points out that the democratic deficit is a problem that threatens to undermine the European integrationist project. Over the years, the European Union has assumed an ever greater number of competences that have brought into question whether the European Union's (and its predecessors') activities in the economic sphere were meant solely as a first step in a political and cultural unification. (1995, p.25) . In this manner, the author correctly draws attention to the fact that the European Union is no longer to be thought of as an entity in existence primarily for its economic logic but, rather, is to be a single Community whose final shape informs its economy. The textual change, however, collapses the goals of the pre and post-Maastricht eras into one, failing to note how the creation of "a single Community" is a goal that transcends the original compass of the pre-Maastricht era 14 The first text reads: "emerging from the terrible experience of two world wars --both of which had begun as European 'civil wars'". The second work reads: "after the terrible experience of two world wars, both of which had begun as European civil wars." 15 Bernard Connolly, once head of the EMS (Economic Monetary System), National and Community Policies Unit in the Commission, has posited that economic integration was only "part of a programme to subvert the independence --political as well as economic Cultural assets such as the city of Venice, the paintings of Rembrandt, the music of Beethoven or the plays of Shakespeare are an integral part of a common cultural heritage and are regarded as common property by the citizens of Europe. (1995, p.73) In this manner, Borchardt appropriates the cultural assets heretofore considered fundamental aspects of national cultures and contentiously claims them as an element of a common European heritage while simultaneously stressing the political dimension of European integration.
The social dimension, too, is an area in which Borchardt pursues a line of argumentation that is an imprecise depiction of European history, re-ordering the timeline of integration and thus obscuring the belated entry of social policy into the project of integration. In discussing the social aims of European Union, the author merely declares that "the Treaties did not map out any coherent scheme for a future common social policy" (1995, p.26) when in fact the social dimension of integration only became a topic of serious discussion in the late 1980s. Furthermore, the reason for the exclusion of social policy from the original Treaties is directly attributed to indecision over whether the establishment of the common market required the broad alignment of social security costs or whether in practice it would inevitably bring the Member States' social security arrangements into line with one another. (1995, p.26) Borchardt thus ascribes the lack of a coherent social policy to indecision over how best to achieve advances in the social sphere when in fact several Member States were reluctant if not downright hostile to the idea of giving up their right to budget and control social security within their borders, this competence having been integral to the consolidation of the nation-state in the early to mid 20 th century.
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Borchardt's vision of the social dimension of Europe connects with the manner in which the author envisions the European project and its aims. In this discussion,
Borchardt explicitly describes what he feels to be the aims of European Unification, albeit differently from edition to edition. In the original text, Borchardt declared that the aim of European unification is:
to preserve and strengthen peace, to achieve economic integration for the benefit of all the peoples of Europe through the creation of a large economic area, and to work towards political union. (1986, p.19) In the second text, however, this same passage is altered to read:
to preserve and strengthen peace, to achieve economic integration for the benefits of all citizens of the Union through the creation of a single internal market, to work towards political union and, last but not least, to strengthen and promote social cohesion within the Union. (1995, p.23) In the transition from one passage to the next, we find numerous points of substantial interest. First, social cohesion, while being only a goal of recent vintage, is appended to the other aims (the preservation and strengthening of peace as well as economic integration) that long predate it with only the slightest hint that this is a new policy area.
Second, while the first passage makes note of only the geographical connectivity between Europeans --Europeans being merely those people that inhabit the geographical area that is Europe --the more recent text adds a layer of political affiliation, Europeans no longer being described just as "the peoples of Europe" but having become "citizens of the Union." Third, and perhaps most importantly, Borchardt fails to note that the goals of European integration have undergone any change over time. Thus, while the author's statements are in the strictest sense true, the omission of any mention of change to the goals of European integration obscures the fact that integration is not based upon a set of unchanging goals but an evolutionary process through which new goals have been constantly articulated.
III. Pascal Fontaine's Europe in Ten Points --The Images Speak For Themselves
Up to this point, this study has focused on textual explorations of how
Europeanists are revising the historical record. Yet it is not only by way of words that meaning is constructed; images, too, provide us with a means of understanding how changes are being implemented and what these changes mean in aggregate.
No text is more illustrative of an evolution in imagery than Pascal Fontaine's Europe in Ten Lessons. This booklet, having undergone four editions thus far, has expanded from its original edition in which not a single illustration was present to its more recent incarnations in which pictures are utilized to introduce each chapter as well as illustrate key points. For the purposes of this study, I will examine the versions of this text printed in 1995 and 1998 to compare and contrast the meanings of the messages to be found therein.
For ideas to resonate most profoundly in non-textual form, a common motif is often employed as a point of reference. In the 1995 version of Fontaine's pamphlet, the common motif utilized was that of Homo Europeanus, a stick figure character whose European identity is represented by his head being in the form of Europe's twelve stars. European and recounting the achievements of the European integrationist project. Like the nation-states that had come before it, the European Union had matured to a point at which it possessed its own distinct history that would be passed on from generation to generation.
Conclusion
In the course of this paper, we have surveyed a sampling of the textual and non- 
